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Unchecked Monopolies: The Questionable Constitutionality of 
Design Patent and Product Design Trade Dress Overlap in Light 
of Egyptian goddEss, inc. v. swisa, inc.
by Ellie B. Atkins
IntroductIon
 
 Last summer, Samsung suffered a large blow 
in what has now been dubbed by the media as the 
“Smartphone Wars” when Apple received a $1.05 
billion dollar jury award after suing Samsung for patent 
and trade dress infringement.1  The policy underlying 
intellectual property law reflects a tension between 
incentivizing invention by protecting creators’ rights 
and maximizing the public benefit.  This balance 
was clearly at the heart of the now notorious Apple v. 
Samsung case, where following the large jury award 
for Apple, the parties quickly issued public statements 
expressing opposing sentiments.2  Apple characterized 
the win as a victory for inventors’ rights:
 
The lawsuits . . . were about 
much more than patents or 
money. They were about 
values. At Apple, we value 
originality and innovation and 
pour our lives into making 
the best products on earth. 
We make these products to 
delight our customers, not for 
our competitors to flagrantly 
copy. We applaud the court for 
. . . sending a loud and clear 
message that stealing isn’t 
right.3
Samsung, however, emphasized the alternative side 
of the tension, saying, “Today’s verdict should not 
be viewed as a win for Apple, but as a loss for the 
American consumer.”4 
1.  See Agustino Fontevecchia, Smartphone Wars: Who 
Wins And Who Loses From The Apple-Samsung Patent Ruling, 
ForBes (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
afontevecchia/2012/08/27/smartphone-wars-who-wins-and-who-
loses-from-the-apple-samsung-patent-ruling/. 
2.  Brian X. Chen, Apple Beats Samsung: First Reactions, 
nY tImes BLog: BIts (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), http://bits.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/08/24/samsung-apple-reactions/.
3.  Chen, supra note 2.
4.  Bryan Bishop, Samsung: Today’s Verdict ‘a Loss for the 
American Consumer’, the verge (last visited Apr. 11, 2013), http://
www.theverge.com/2012/8/24/3266653/samsung-todays-apple-
 As intellectual property law continues to 
evolve, the underlying policy goals endure unchanged.  
This recent case highlights the economic importance of 
intellectual property law5 and serves as an example of 
a rights holder seeking to maximize his protection by 
obtaining overlapping rights.  In fact, Apple obtained 
both design patent protection and trade dress protection 
for the iPhone and iPad, the products at the heart of 
this dispute.6  In light of the high financial stakes,7 it is 
important that courts remain diligently committed to 
preserving the balance between benefitting the public 
and incentivizing innovation.  However, in a 2008 
decision, the Federal Circuit shifted the balance of 
intellectual property rights, blending design patent and 
trade dress in a way this Comment argues is potentially 
unconstitutional.8
 Conflating these two intellectual property 
rights tilts the underlying balance strongly in favor 
of the inventor or rights holder.  Design patents 
are constitutionally granted for a limited amount 
of time,9 whereas trade dress protection exists 
trial-statement-loss-american-consumer.
5.  The jury awarded Apple $1.05 billion for Samsung’s 
infringement.  See Connie Guglielmo, Apple Wins Over Jury in 
Samsung Patent Dispute, Awarded $1.05 Billion in Damages, 
ForBes (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
connieguglielmo/2012/08/24/jury-has-reached-verdict-in-apple-
samsung-patent-suit-court-to-announce-it-shortly/.
6.  Apple obtained registered trade dress for the iPhone 
design, but also asserted unregistered trade dress protection in 
this case.  See Nilay Patel, Apple vs. Samsung: inside a jury’s 
nightmare, the verge (last visited Apr. 11, 2013), www.theverge.
com/2012/8/23/3260463/apple-samsung-jury-verdict-form-
nightmare.
7.  Part of the $1.05 billion award in the Apple v. Samsung 
case was attributable to trade dress infringement and design patent 
infringement.  See Guglielmo, supra note 5; see also Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Adidas Award of $305M in Trademark Infringement Case 
May be Record, ABA JournAL news (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/adidas_award_of_305m_
in_trademark_infringement_case_may_be_record/ ($305 million 
jury award for trademark infringement).
8.   See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 543 F.3d 665 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (abridging the previous design patent infringement 
test and establishing the ordinary observer test as the sole analysis 
for design patent infringement). 
9.  See U.S. const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have 
power to . . . promote the progress of science and useful arts by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”).
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potentially indefinitely.10  Considered an important 
case for clarifying the design patent infringement 
test, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,11 also, 
perhaps inadvertently, tore down a wall separating 
product design trade dress protection from design 
patents when it abridged the previous design patent 
infringement test and adopted a test remarkably 
similar to the infringement test for trade dress.  Courts 
repeatedly stated prior to Egyptian Goddess that 
parties may pursue trade dress protection for a product 
design already protected by a design patent because 
they considered the two protections separate and 
distinct bodies of law granting independent rights.12  
However, following the Egyptian Goddess decision, 
the rights grew alarmingly close, theoretically allowing 
for parties to undermine the policy considerations 
supporting these legal doctrines.13  The potential for 
abuse is specifically concerning for product design 
trade dress, which requires a showing of secondary 
meaning14 a burden much lessened by the existence of 
a design patent granting monopolized use for fourteen 
years.15  
This Comment will argue that the rationale 
10.  See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 
595, 605 (1996) (explaining that trademarks’ indefinite protection 
depends on the strength and duration of the public’s recognition 
of the mark); see also 1 mccArthY on trAdemArks And unFAIr 
comPetItIon § 8:1 (4th ed.) (noting trade dress receives the same 
protection as trademarks under the Lanham Act). 
11.  543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
12.  See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 
1985) (citing their separate infringement tests as justification for 
the allowance of trade dress and design patent overlap); Application 
of Mogen David Wine Corp., 140 U.S.P.Q. 575, 549 (1964) (“In 
our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair 
competition, which happen to continue beyond the expiration of 
a design patent, do not ‘extend’ the patent monopoly.  They exist 
independently of it, under different law and for different reasons.”). 
13.  The potential overlap of design patent and trade 
dress protection could provide an extended patent monopoly.  
Justification for the patent law monopoly is that the right is time-
limited.  However, as the rights begin to merge closer together it is 
more difficult to condone allowing a design patent holder to obtain 
indefinite trade dress protection for the same ornamental design 
subject of a design patent.  See Krueger Int’l, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 
at 604-05 (stating the policy goals of patent law are to encourage 
invention by providing a limited monopoly whereas the goals of 
trademark law are to prevent consumer confusion as to the source 
of the goods). 
14.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 
U.S. 205 (2000) (deciding that product design trade dress requires 
secondary meaning to establish the distinctiveness necessary for 
trade dress protection). 
15.  See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 
903 F. Supp. 1457, 1460-61 (D. Kan. 1995) (“Granting trade dress 
protection to an item for which a patent has expired creates tension 
because the product may have obtained secondary meaning or 
inherent distinctiveness precisely because the product was patented.  
If so, the trade dress protection does not have an independent basis 
and effectively extends the monopoly granted by the patent.”).
for allowing trade dress protection proceeding from 
an expired or current design patent is erroneous in 
light of the Egyptian Goddess test for design patent 
infringement.  In focusing on the infringement test, 
it will assess whether trade dress (particularly for 
product design) and design patents are actually distinct, 
independent legal doctrines.  This Comment will 
conclude that courts should hold parties seeking trade 
dress protection for product design where they already 
have a design patent to a higher standard, in line with 
the Supreme Court’s goals in Wal-Mart Stores Inc., v. 
Samara Brothers, Inc.16 
Part I will discuss the history of design 
patent and trade dress protection.  Specifically, it 
will assess the history of the infringement tests for 
each intellectual property doctrine and the rationales 
underlying the infringement tests.  Furthermore, it will 
evaluate case law before and after Egyptian Goddess 
to compare courts’ design patent infringement analysis.  
It will also review case law prior to Egyptian Goddess 
that assessed the coexistence of design patent and trade 
dress to further examine courts’ varying rationales.  
Part II will assess whether design patents and product 
design trade dress are really distinct, independent legal 
doctrines.  Assessing the substantial shift caused by 
Egyptian Goddess, the Comment will argue that courts’ 
previous reasoning for allowing design patent and trade 
dress overlap—that the legal regimes are separate and 
distinct—is now erroneous because the two protections 
have been rendered nearly identical over time.  By 
analyzing potential situations in which this may allow 
for extended protection, this Comment will discuss the 
potential unconstitutionality of this protective overlap 
and its opposition to patent and trademark policy.  In 
conclusion, this Comment will recommend a more 
stringent standard for product design trade dress where 
the design was previously, or is currently, protected 
by a design patent to ensure these legal doctrines do, 
in fact, remain independent and distinct.  Specifically, 
requiring strong proof of distinctiveness for secondary 
meaning may provide the necessary safeguard from 
unchecked design monopolies. 
16.  See Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. at 212 (recognizing that 
trade dress for product design, like a color, does not immediately 
serve a source-defining function in the minds of consumers, and 
thus, since it is not inherently distinctive, should require secondary 
meaning to establish distinctiveness before trade dress protection 
attaches).  
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I. BAckground 
 A.  The History and Basic Principles  
  of Patent Law
 Patent law authority is derived from the 
Constitution.17  The Constitution provides, in what 
is commonly referred to as the Intellectual Property 
Clause, “Congress shall have power to . . . promote 
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”18  
This clause provides the constitutional authority for 
patent rights, laying out the framework for providing 
a time-limited monopoly in an effort to incentivize 
invention.19  Patents are a negative right in that they 
require no positive action be taken by a patent holder 
and provide only for the right to exclude others from 
using or selling a patented invention.20   Patent law has 
three central purposes: first, to encourage and reward 
invention; second, to disclose inventions; and, third, 
to protect the public domain by maintaining stringent 
patentability requirements.21
 B. desIgn PAtents 
There are two types of patents: utility patents 
for functional inventions and design patents for 
ornamental designs.  Protection for design patents 
was codified in 1842 to fill a gap that existed between 
copyright and patent law.22  There are fundamental 
differences between utility and design patents, most 
17.  See U.S. const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
18.  Id.
19.  See Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Gibbens Frame, 
17 F. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (explaining that patent law provides 
a benefit to both the inventor and the public because the inventor 
is given a limited monopoly and the public benefits from the 
invention’s disclosure).
20.  See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 
U.S. 405, 425 (1908) (describing the patent right as the “right to 
exclude”). 
21.  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 
(1979).
22.  See Susan Scafidi et al., Panel II: The Global Contours of 
IP Protection for Trade Dress, Industrial Design, Applied Art, and 
Product Configuration, 20 FordhAm InteLL. ProP. medIA & ent. 
L.J. 783, 787 (2010) (explaining that design patents do not have 
a functionality component like utility patents because they were 
created to “fill the gap between copyright and patent protection”), 
see also Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design 
Patent Rights, 24 hArv. J.L. & tech. (2010) (manuscript at 41), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1656590 (recounting the 
Commissioner of Patents’ remarks in support of the Patent Act of 
1902 when he testified that the role of design patents would be as 
a “gap-fill[er]” for the space between utility patents and copyright 
law).      
notably the functionality requirement and the length 
of protection.23  Utility patents last for twenty years 
beginning on the application filing date, whereas 
the term for a design patent is only fifteen years.24  
Moreover, functionality is a requirement for the 
issuance of a utility patent, but it is not a requirement 
for a design patent.25  
 Previously, design patents were routinely 
mischaracterized and underutilized.26  However, 
throughout the past decade, design patenting has 
experienced rapid growth.27  Some of the growth 
correlates to the creation of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit in 1982, a court established to 
unify and strengthen the patent system.28  However, 
other design patent growth spikes correlate with recent 
landmark trade dress cases such as Samara Bros. and 
TrafFix, cases that resulted in more stringent trade 
dress requirements and thereby made design patents 
more appealing.29  Additionally, the recent Egyptian 
23.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 173 (2011), amended by Patent Law 
Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, 126 
Stat. 1527. 
24.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2011) (dictating the term 
length for a utility patent), with 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2011) amended by 
Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
211, 126 Stat. 1527 (dictating the term length for a design patent); 
see also Jeff John Roberts, From Ipads to Crocs, New Patent Law 
Protects Design, BLoomBerg BusInessweek (Dec. 28, 2012), www.
businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-28/from-ipads-to-crocs-new-
patent-law-protects-design#p1 (discussing the recently-signed 
Patent Law Treaties Implantation Act of 2012, which changed 
the design patent term from fourteen years to fifteen years, and 
speculating that the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
should expect a dramatic rise in design patent applications as a 
result of the new law). 
25.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011), with 35 U.S.C. § 
171 (2011); see also Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 9) 
n. 36 (noting that the requirements for a utility patent are that 
the invention be new, useful, and classifiable into one of four 
categories, whereas the requirements for a design patent are that 
it be new, original, ornamental, and a design for an article of 
manufacture).
26.  See Scott D. Locke, Fifth Avenue and the Patent Lawyer: 
Strategies for Using Design Patents to Increase the Value of 
Fashion and Luxury Goods Companies, 5 J. mArshALL rev. InteLL. 
ProP. L. 40, 53 (2005) (acknowledging that some refer to design 
patents as “soft or minor patents”). 
27.  See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 16-20) 
(documenting the dramatic increase in design patents over 
the course of the last decade); see also Roberts, supra note 24 
(predicting that design patents will become even more popular as a 
result of the newly-signed Patent Law Treaties Imlantation Act of 
2012).  
28.  See Id. (manuscript at 17-18).
29.  See id. (suggesting that the these cases resulted in stricter 
requirements for trade dress protection because the Samara 
Bros., Inc. holding required that trade dress for product design 
obtain secondary meaning before protection attaches, and the 
court in Traffix stated that there should be a strong presumption 
of functionality where a utility patent previously existed, which 
created a strong hurdle for those seeking trade dress protection on a 
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Goddess case may explain some of the latest design 
patent popularity.30  Recently decided in 2008, this case 
simplified the design patent infringement test, lessening 
the burden for rights holders to prove design patent 
infringement.31
The process of obtaining a design patent can 
be much faster than that of other intellectual property 
rights.  In comparison to trade dress, obtaining a 
design patent, a process referred to as “prosecution,” 
is a much simpler and faster process.32  Whereas trade 
dress protection for product design requires secondary 
meaning before protection attaches, design patents can 
be issued even before the product is used in commerce 
or known to the consumer.33  
 Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts used a 
test for evaluating design patent infringement that 
consisted of two steps.34  First, courts employed the 
ordinary observer test, which assessed whether an 
ordinary observer would be deceived by the allegedly 
infringing design into thinking it was the patented 
object.35  Second, courts applied the point of novelty 
test, which required that the allegedly infringing 
device incorporated the same point of novelty as 
the patented device.36  Novelty is a requirement for 
feature previously covered by a utility patent). 
30.  See Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh 
Perspective on Design Patents, 38-Jul coLo. LAw. 71 (2009) 
(suggesting there will be a surge in design patents after the Egyptian 
Goddess decision).
31.   Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 668 
(Fed. Cir. 2008).  
32.   See Crouch, supra note 22, (manuscript at 18-19) (noting 
that the design patent issueance rate is more than ninety percent and 
suggesting that this rate results from the fact that design patents are 
not closely scruitnized by the patent examiners).  Design patents 
issue much faster than trade dress, particularly trade dress for 
product design, which requires secondary meaning before any rights 
attach.  Compare Id. (manuscript at 20) (calculating that nearly half 
of the design patents issued in 2009 were under review for less than 
a year), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 
205, 211 (2000) (establishing product design trade dress requires 
secondary meaning to establish the distinctiveness necessary for 
trade dress protection).  See also Roberts, supra note 24 (quoting 
a lawyer who stated he believes the prosecution process for design 
patents is relataively easy and has obtained a design patent in 
approximately sixty days).    
33.  See Crouch, supra note 22, (manuscript at 23-24) 
(explaining Apple’s multi-layered protection approach, which 
included a design patent application filed weeks before its public 
release date, followed by trademark registration for the same 
design). 
34.  See generally Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 
(discussing the merits of the second step of design patent 
infringement, namely, the point of novelty test). 
35.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 670 (explaining 
the history of the ordinary observer test, which originated from 
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871)). 
36.  See id. (crediting Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), as the creator of the point 
design patentability.37  A design is considered novel 
if an ordinary observer would consider the design to 
be different from prior designs, rather than a mere 
modification of an existing design, when viewing the 
design as a whole.38 
Egyptian Goddess eliminated the second 
step, taking issue with the applicability of the point 
of novelty test.39  The court reasoned that the point 
of novelty test required exaggerated emphasis on 
small, often inconsequential, differences between 
the patented and accused products, thereby assigning 
undue importance to a feature simply because it could 
be characterized as novel.40  In this landmark case, 
Egyptian Goddess sued Swisa, Inc. for design patent 
infringement of its nail buffer.41  Egyptian Goddess’ 
nail buffer consisted of a rectangular hollow tube with 
a square cross-section that featured buffer surfaces 
on three of its four sides.42  Swisa’s product was a 
rectangular, hollow tube with a square cross-section, 
but it had buffer surfaces on all four sides.43  In finding 
no infringement and ruling for Swisa, the Federal 
Circuit said “no reasonable fact-finder could find that 
EGI met its burden of showing, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that an ordinary observer, taking 
into account the prior art, would believe the accused 
design to be the same as the patented design.”44  The 
Federal Circuit stressed in its decision that an ordinary 
observer with knowledge of the relevant prior art 
is well-equipped to determine whether two designs 
are substantially similar.  Thus, the court argued, 
adopting the Ordinary Observer test as the sole test for 
infringement better achieves the original goals of the 
Point of Novelty Test and avoids the Point of Novelty 
of novelty test because it held that proof of similarity under the 
ordinary observer test was not enough to prove design patent 
infringement).  
37.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 171 (stating a design must be “new” to 
be patentable).  
38.  See generally Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 169 (2012). 
39.  Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 671-78 (discussing 
potential problems with the point of novelty test including that it is 
difficult to apply where there are multiple point of novelty).
40.  See id. at 677 (taking issue with the point of novelty 
serving as an excuse for potential design patent infringers). 
41.  See id. at 682-83.  However, after establishing the new 
test, the Court did not remand to the lower court, instead analyzing 
the case itself.  Ultimately, it found the relevant consumer was 
unlikely to be deceived by the allegedly infringing device.  See 
Perry J. Saidman, Egyptian Goddess Exposed! But Not in the 
Buff(er) . . ., 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 880-87 
(2008) (arguing the Federal Circuit misapplied the test to the facts 
of this case).
42.  See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 668.  
43.  See id.
44.  Id. at 682.
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Test pitfalls.45 
c.  History and Basic Principles of   
  Trademark Law
 Unlike patent and copyright law, trademark 
law does not derive its authority from the Intellectual 
Property clause of the Constitution.46  Instead, 
trademark law is grounded in the Lanham Act,47 which 
draws its constitutional authority from the Commerce 
Clause.48  The primary goal of trademark law is to 
prevent consumer confusion as to the source of goods 
and to protect companies’ good will.49  This doctrine 
of law strives to ensure that companies are able to 
properly distinguish their goods from others so that 
consumers may easily ascertain the source of goods 
they see in commerce.50  
 A trademark must be distinctive to receive 
Lanham Act protection, and distinctiveness may 
be acquired either inherently or through secondary 
meaning.51  Distinctiveness is assessed on a sliding 
scale ranging from generic terms to arbitrary or fanciful 
words.52  Generic marks are not granted any protection, 
whereas an arbitrary or fanciful mark receives 
automatic protection upon its use in commerce.53  
Between these two ends of the spectrum are descriptive 
terms and suggestive terms.54  Suggestive terms, 
like arbitrary or fanciful terms, are considered to be 
45.  See id. at 677-78 (reasoning that an ordinary observer 
would be naturally drawn to the differences between the claimed 
and accused designs that render them distinct from prior art).
46.  Trademark Law is derived from the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051-1141(n). 
47.  Id.
48.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
49.  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 
767-68 (1992) (describing the purposes of the Lanham Act as 
preventing deception and protecting against unfair competition). 
50.  See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 in discussing eligibility of 
marks only if they serve source-identifying purposes). 
51.  See id. at 768 (setting forth the “general rule” that 
trademarks may achieve distinctiveness either inherently or by 
acquisition); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (setting fourth the four categories 
of distinctiveness). 
52.  See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 (“Arrayed 
in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to 
trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these 
classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) 
arbitrary or fanciful.”).
53.  See id. (explaining that a mark may become cancelled at 
any point if it becomes generic, a burden no secondary meaning 
can overcome because it would put competitors at an unfair 
disadvantage). 
54.  See id. (clarifying that descriptive words may obtain 
protection upon a showing of secondary meaning, but that 
suggestive words do not). 
inherently distinctive and thus trademark protection 
is granted automatically upon the product’s use in 
commerce.55  However, merely descriptive terms 
require an additional showing of secondary meaning 
(or five years use in commerce) before trademark 
protection attaches.56  Secondary meaning requires that, 
in the minds of the public, the primary significance of 
the mark is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.57  This does not necessarily 
mean that the consumer must know which specific 
source the goods come from, only that the consumer 
must know it comes from a single, albeit often 
unknown, source.58  In analyzing secondary meaning, 
courts look to a non-exhaustive list of factors, none of 
which are alone determinative, including advertising 
costs, consumer studies, media coverage, amount of 
sales, and length and exclusivity of the trade dress 
use.59 
Additionally, trademark law restricts 
protection to those marks that are not functional.60  The 
functionality doctrine forbids a producer to control a 
useful product feature, which would inhibit legitimate 
competition, in adherence to the overarching goals of 
trademark law of protecting the consumer by promoting 
competition and protecting companies’ reputations.61  A 
product feature is considered functional if it is essential 
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the 
cost or quality of the article and would put competitors 
55.  See id. (explaining suggestive marks were created to fill 
the large void between merely descriptive and arbitrary marks).
56.  See id. at 10 (suggesting that the five year exception was 
created so as not to deprive the mark owner who has put forth 
substantial effort and money into creating good will and brand 
recognition). 
57.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
163 (1995) (assessing secondary meaning in determining whether a 
color can achieve trademark protection (citing Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982))).
58.  See mccArthY, supra note 10, § 3:1 (stating that the 
purpose of trademarks is to distinguish the source of one seller’s 
goods from another source’s goods).  
59.   See Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8556, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (weighing factors such as 
Topps’ advertising, sales success, and extended exclusive use in 
the United States to determine that the Ring Pop trade dress has 
achieved secondary meaning). 
60.  See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165 (“The functionality 
doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead 
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control 
a useful product feature.”).
61.  See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. 
Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“the doctrine serves to promote 
competition by protecting advances in functional design from being 
monopolized and encouraging the broadest dissemination of useful 
design features.” (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 
327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See 
also mccArthY, supra note 10, § 7:26[3][b].  
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at a significant, non-reputation related disadvantage.62 
d. Trade Dress 
 The Lanham Act also protects trade dress, 
which is either the product packaging of a good or the 
product design or configuration, so long as it serves a 
source-identifying function.63  Trade dress protection 
can protect the product itself, the design of the product, 
the package design, or even “features such as size, 
shape, color or color combinations, texture, [or] 
graphics.”64  
The Supreme Court created separate 
distinctiveness rules for product packaging and product 
design in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 
Inc.65  In this trade dress infringement case, Samara 
Brothers, Inc. sued when Wal-Mart intentionally 
began selling direct replicas of Samara Brothers baby 
clothes.66  Following Supreme Court precedent in Taco 
Cabana,67 Samara Brothers argued that its marks were 
inherently distinctive and thus did not require proof 
of secondary meaning.68  The Court required proof 
of secondary meaning for Samara Brothers clothing, 
while still upholding Taco Cabana, by classifying Taco 
Cabana’s trade dress as product packaging and Samara 
Brothers’ trade dress as product design.69  Thus, the 
Taco Cabana decision came to stand for the premise 
that product packaging is inherently distinctive and 
does not require proof of secondary meaning, whereas 
the Samara Brothers case asserted that product design 
is not inherently distinctive, therefore requiring proof 
of secondary meaning before trade dress protection 
attaches.70
Trade dress infringement is analyzed according 
to the same consumer confusion test used for trademark 
62.  See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982). 
63.  See Krueger Int’l, 915 F. Supp. at 601 (setting forth the 
different interpretations of trade dress as either the total image of 
the product or particular features).  
64.  See id. (quoting LeSportsac, Inc. v. KMart Corp., 754 F.2d 
71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
65.  529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
66.  See id. at 207-08 (discussing Wal-Mart’s actions in 
sending its designer photographs of plaintiff’s goods and requesting 
exact replicas to be sold in Wal-Mart stores). 
67.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
68.  See Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 214-15 (dismissing 
respondent’s contention that Two Pesos forbids requiring all product 
design trade dress to show secondary meaning).
69.  See id. (finding the décor in the Taco Cabana restaurant 
qualifies as product packaging rather than product design). 
70.  Once something has proven distinctiveness, the party 
seeking trade dress protection must also establish that the mark is 
non-functional. 
infringement.71  Each federal circuit employs their own 
version of a multi-factor test for infringement focused 
on whether or not the consumer would be confused as 
to the source of the goods.72  The federal circuit tests 
differ slightly, but generally reflect the same eight 
factors:  strength of the mark, proximity of the goods, 
similarity of the marks, actual confusion, similar 
marketing channels, consumer sophistication, bad faith 
of the defendant, and quality of the defendant’s goods.73
e.  A Brief History of the Relevant   
  Case Law
1. Courts’ interpretation of design patent 
infringement and the focal shift 
resulting from Egyptian Goddess
 Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts employed 
the two-part infringement test.74  For example, in 
Hosley International Trading Corp. v. K Mart Corp.,75 
plaintiff Hosley International Trading Corporation 
had a design patent for the ornamental design of a 
cauldron-shaped votive candleholder, which it claimed 
was infringed by the defendant.  The court found no 
infringement, citing the second prong of the two-part 
test, namely that the two designs did not incorporate 
the same point of novelty.76  In Metrokane, Inc. v. 
Wine Enthusiast,77 Metrokane sued for design patent 
infringement concerning its corkscrew opening 
device, trademarked and sold under the name “the 
Rabbit.”78  The court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants, finding design patents inappropriate for 
part of the device and a lack of substantial similarity 
between the two devices.79 
After eliminating the second part of the two-
part test in Egyptian Goddess, courts naturally began to 
71.  See Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 766 (applying the 
likelihood of confusion test to trade dress infringement). 
72.  See e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 
492, 493 (2d Cir. 1961); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 
(9th Cir. 1979).
73.  See AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 341 (explaining the multi-factor 
test for infringement).
74.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 
670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the previously used two-part test 
that consisted of the ordinary observer test and the point of novelty 
test).
75.  237 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
76.  See id. at 912-13 (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment after finding that defendant’s accused device did not 
incorporate the same ring and raised pattern on the handle that 
served as a point of novelty for plaintiff’s device).  
77.  185 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
78.  Id. at 324.
79.  Id. at 327-30.
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focus on ordinary observer confusion in infringement 
cases.80  In Huztler Manufacturing Co. v. Bradshaw 
International Inc.,81 Huztler sought an injunction 
barring the sale of Bradshaw’s products, which Huztler 
alleged infringed its design patents for garlic and onion 
food-preserving storage containers.82  The court granted 
Huztler’s preliminary injunction, finding that the two 
products would appear visually very similar to an 
ordinary consumer shopping for the product.83  
 
2. The Supreme Court’s Long-Standing 
Skepticism of Overlapping Rights 
The Supreme Court has long viewed 
overlapping rights, or more specifically rights 
stemming from a current or expired patent, with 
skepticism.84  For example, in Singer Manufacturing 
Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.,85 the plaintiff, Singer, 
had many utility patents for its sewing machines, and 
upon expiration of those patents, competitors entered 
into the field copying the functional aspects of the 
machines and calling them Singer sewing machines.86  
Singer sued, claiming trademark rights in the name 
Singer, and attempted to prevent its competitors from 
copying the name and design of Singer machines.87  
Although the Court ultimately ruled that the 
competitors were barred from using the name Singer 
on their goods, it recognized that the competitors 
were, however, free to copy the design and form of the 
machine: 
It is self-evident that on the 
expiration of a patent the 
monopoly created by it ceases to 
exist, and the right to make the 
thing formerly covered by the 
patent becomes public property.  
It is upon this condition that the 
patent is granted.  It follows, as 
80.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 
671 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (eliminating the second part test, and thus 
shifting the focus to the first prong of the test: confusion amongst 
ordinary observers).  
81.  Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l, Inc., 11 CIV. 7211 
PGG, 2012 WL 3031150 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2012).
82.  Id.
83.  Id. at *13-15.
84.  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
539 U.S. 23 (2003); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 
225 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); 
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
85.  163 U.S. 169 (1896).
86.  Id. at 170.
87.  Id.
a matter of course, that on the 
termination of the patent there 
passes to the public the right to 
make the machine in the form 
in which it was constructed 
during the patent.88
Echoing this same sentiment, the Court in a more 
recent case, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,89 
wrote “when [a] patent expires, the monopoly created 
by it expires, too, and the right to make the article—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it 
carried when patented—passes to the public.”90  
In each of these cases, the Court emphasized 
its concern with maintaining an equal balance between 
the public domain and the benefit to the designer or 
inventor.  Specifically, the Court addresses its unease 
with rights holders exploiting or manipulating various 
protections to circumvent the legal intentions of each, 
specifically, their limitations.   
3. Lower Courts’ Inconsistent Case Law 
Concerning Trade Dress and Design 
Patent Overlap 
 Despite courts’ longstanding reservations 
about potential protective overlap, many courts do 
allow simultaneous protection, and it is very common 
for plaintiffs to obtain multiple forms of intellectual 
property protection.91  In 1995, the Southern District 
of New York addressed the validity of trade dress 
protection for a product feature already protected by a 
design patent in Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc.92  
Hubbell sued defendants Pass & Seymour and Legrand 
for trade dress infringement concerning Hubbell’s 
electrical products.93  The defendants, citing Supreme 
Court precedent, argued that Hubbell’s expired 
design patents for their product precluded trade dress 
protection.94  The court rejected this view, reiterating 
that trade dress and patent law are separate bodies of 
law, with independent policy justifications, different 
88.  Id. at 185.
89.  376 U.S. 225 (1964).
90.  Id. at 230.
91.  See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 45) (explaining 
that it is not uncommon for patent litigation to also include 
allegations of copyright, trade dress, and unfair competition 
charges).  
92.  Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955, 
957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
93.  See id. (discussing Hubbell’s trade dress for its plugs and 
connectors).
94.  See id. at 959 (stressing the unlawful nature of extending 
the patent monopoly).
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sources of authority, and separate infringement tests.95  
A year later, the same court in Topps Co. 
v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co.96 went a step further in 
finding that the existence of an expired design patent 
“presumptively indicates that the design at issue is 
not de jure functional.”97  In this case, Topps Co., 
creator of the Ring Pop, sued Gerrit J. Verburg Co. 
for the defendant’s Diamond Pop, alleging trade 
dress infringement.98  After finding that the Ring 
Pop had achieved secondary meaning, the court also 
addressed the potential functionality of the trade dress, 
which if found to be functional would bar trade dress 
protection.99  Addressing the expired design patent, the 
court echoed its sentiment from Hubbell Inc. in finding 
no conflict between trademark and patent overlap, but 
also indicated that the existence of a design patent 
could prove beneficial to a party seeking trade dress 
protection in that it served to show non-functionality.100
Again in 1996 the Southern District of New 
York reiterated that “[a] design patent is analytically 
distinct from a protectable trade dress, and industrial 
products may qualify for both kinds of protection 
without violating the policy goals of either patent or 
trade dress law.”101  Similar to its decision in Topps, 
the court argued trade dress protection does not extend 
a design patent monopoly, that when a design patent 
expires it becomes copyable, just not “in such a way 
95.  See id. (comparing the goals of patent law and trademark 
law and concluding patent law seeks to further invention whereas 
trademark law seeks to protect the consumer from brand or 
source confusion); id. at 960 (discussing the history of patent 
and trademark coexistence); id. (“The trademark owner has an 
indefinite term of protection, it is true, but in an infringement suit 
must also prove secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion, 
which the owner of a design patent need not do; there is therefore 
no necessary inconsistency between the two modes of protection.” 
(quoting W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 
1985)).  
96.  No. 96 Civ. 7302, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 13, 1996). 
97.  See id. at *30. 
98.  See id. at *1-5 (noting the substantial similarities between 
the two products such as the sales method, configuration of the 
product, and product packaging).
99.  See id. (finding no “particular manufacturing need or 
requirement” for the configuration of the Ring Pop design, and 
noting that this design was probably more difficult and costly to 
manufacture than other available designs). 
100.  See id. at *29-30 (suggesting that the existence of a 
design patent helps parties overcome the burden of showing non-
functionality in obtaining trade dress protection); see also E.Z. 
Bowz, L.L.C. v. Professional Product Research Co., 2003 WL 
22068573 No. 00 Civ. 8670 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), at *24 (finding a 
design patent to be helpful evidence of non-functionality, and thus 
also helpful in establishing trade dress protection). 
101.   See Krueger Int’l Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 
595, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (clearing up “common misconceptions” 
concerning design patent and trade dress overlap).  
that customers are deceived about what they are 
buying.”102 
Many years prior to these cases the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals103 (C.C.P.A.) paved the 
way for the later decisions in finding no issue with 
trade dress protection and design patent overlap.  
Twice, in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.104 and In 
re Honeywell, Inc.,105 the C.C.P.A. overturned the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (T.T.A.B.) to 
find that trade dress does not extend a design patent 
monopoly.106  Interestingly, despite the C.C.P.A.’s 
previous decision in In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 
the T.T.A.B. again denied registration of a trademark 
where a design patent already existed, reasoning it 
would undermine patent law policy.  Predictably, the 
C.C.P.A. reversed, citing its earlier decision.   
While the previous cases are representative 
of the majority viewpoint,107 some courts do reach 
alternative conclusions.108  Notably, in Winning Ways, 
Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear Inc., the district court 
expressed hesitation about the coexistence of design 
patent and trade dress protection, saying, 
[g]ranting trade dress protection 
to an item for which a patent 
has expired creates tension 
because the product may have 
obtained secondary meaning 
or inherent distinctiveness 
precisely because the product 
was patented.  If so, the trade 
dress protection does not 
102.  See id. at 605.  (alluding to the trade dress infringement 
test, which analyzes consumer confusion). 
103.  This court was the precursor to the court of appeals 
for the federal circuit.  See History of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the FederAL cIrcuIt 
hIstorIcAL socIetY, http://www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/
historyofcourt.html (last visited April. 11, 2013). 
104.  328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
105.  532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
106.  In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d at 1266; In re 
Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d at 183.
107.  Julia A. Matheson & Stephen L. Peterson, Combine 
and Conquer: How the Synthesis of Design Patent and Trade 
Dress Achieve Maximum Protection for Your Product Design, 
FInnegAn (May 2009), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
articlesdetail.aspx?news=74f843be-c63a-40cc-8ae0-007bc50fdd99. 
108.  See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 
971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Courts must proceed with caution in 
assessing claims to unregistered trademark protection in the design 
of products so as not to undermine the objectives of the patent laws 
. . . .  Since trademark protection extends for an unlimited period, 
expansive trade dress protection for the design of products would 
prevent some functional products from enriching the public 
domain.”).
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have an independent basis 
and effectively extends the 
monopoly granted by the 
patent.109
This minority viewpoint indicates some courts remain 
suspicious of the potential coexistence of design patent 
and trade dress, recognizing the overlap’s potential to 
undermine the policy goals of the legal doctrines in 
tipping the benefits largely in favor rights holder and 
out of the public’s favor.
II. AnALYsIs
In light of the Egyptian Goddess design patent 
infringement test shift, the potential coexistence of 
trade dress following the issuance of a design patent 
undermines the constitutional grant and policy goals 
of patent law.110  Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts 
justifying simultaneous trade dress and design patent 
protection reasoned that the two were distinct bodies 
of law, evidenced by their separate policy goals 
and infringement tests.111  In light of the fact that 
trade dress and design patents now adhere to similar 
infringement tests, the boundaries of these rights are 
also nearly identical.112  The potential for overlap is 
most concerning for product design trade dress, which 
the Supreme Court ruled in Samara Brothers could 
never be inherently distinctive.113  As a result, the Court 
109.  See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, 
Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1457, 1460-61 (D. Kan. 1995) (emphasizing 
adherence to the underlying policy goals of patent law in noting that 
the public’s access is still restricted where trade dress protection 
attaches to a design that should have fallen into the public domain 
following the design patent’s expiration).
110.  This Comment argues that following Egyptian Goddess, 
the infringement tests for design patents and trade dress became 
nearly identical, thereby conflating the rights and the protections 
associated with them.  As such, a rights holder could potentially 
obtain both design patent protection and trade dress protection, 
which would allow him to extend the patent monopoly right in 
substance, but not in name.  
111.  See, e.g., In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 
579 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (“In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights 
under the law of unfair competition, which happen to continue 
beyond the expiration of a design patent, do not “extend” the patent 
monopoly.  They exist independently of it, under different law and 
for different reasons.”).
112.  The court in Egyptian Goddess abridged the infringement 
test for design patents, eliminating the point of novelty test and 
re-focusing infringement on consumer confusion.  See Egyptian 
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 671 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
The infringement test for trade dress also hinges on the likelihood 
of consumer confusion; AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 
(9th Cir. 1979) (explaining the multi-factor test for infringement).  
As such, both legal doctrines protect the rights holder from products 
that might deceive a consumer in the marketplace.  
113.   See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 
required that all product design trade dress achieve 
secondary meaning before trade dress protection 
attaches.114  Allowing trade dress protection where 
a design patent already protects the same feature 
significantly lessens the burden that the Supreme 
Court established in Samara Brothers.115  That burden, 
establishing secondary meaning, will be significantly 
lessened by the years of monopolized use resulting 
from the patent.116  
A. The Egyptian Goddess holding lessens 
the burden for rights holders in proving 
infringement and further merges design 
patents with trade dress. 
 Prior to Egyptian Goddess, design patent 
infringement was not as common as the two-part 
test was often a difficult hurdle for patent holders to 
overcome.117  Even where a party could show that an 
U.S. 205, 214-15 (2000) (distinguishing product design from 
product packaging and finding that the former cannot be inherently 
distinctive).  
114.  Id. at 215.
115.  See id. at 212-13 (explaining that product design serves 
more than just a source-designating function and thus secondary 
meaning should be established as a burden to show that it does 
in fact serve a source-identifying function before trade dress 
protection attaches).
116.  Secondary meaning is established when in the minds 
of the relevant consumers, the trademark or trade dress comes to 
serve a source-identifying function.  mccArthY, supra note 10, § 
15:1.  If potential consumers are prevented from utilizing the same 
design patented feature(s), the product design will begin to serve 
as a differentiating function for the brand, thus separating it from 
the competitors’ products.  It will then also more easily become 
a source-identifying feature rather than a descriptive feature for 
the product because of its unique status as the only product with 
that design amongst its competitors.  For example, if a particularly 
popular salt and pepper shaker was shaped as a penguin, and 
the company that sold this product obtained a design patent for 
the penguin shape, it could use that design patent to prevent any 
competitor from selling a similar good in a similar penguin shaped 
design.  Thus, consumers will begin to associate the penguin shape 
with the source of the good (the company that makes it) and not 
as an indicator that the product is a salt and pepper shaker, which 
hypothetically may have been the case if competitors were able 
to copy the design and the penguin shape became an increasingly 
popular shape for salt and pepper shakers.  Additionally, the design 
patent will give the company fifteen years of production that can 
serve as evidence of continued sales, which would help establish 
secondary meaning.  See mccArthY, supra note 10, § 15:1 (4th 
ed.) (stating that evidence of secondary meaning may consist of 
direct evidence, in the form of a customer survey, or circumstantial 
evidence, in the form of the input of the seller or circumstantial 
evidence, which can consist of evidence of sales volume, length 
of time used, and the quantity and quality of advertising and 
promotion exposing customers to the symbol).
117.  See Hosley Int’l Trading Corp. v. K Mart Corp., 237 F. 
Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) dismissed sub nom. Hosley Int’l 
Trading Corp. v. Designco, 79 F. App’x 429 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the case “not surprisingly” turned on whether the two devices 
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ordinary observer would be deceived by the allegedly 
infringing product, oftentimes the points of novelty 
would be different, thus stifling a party’s claim for 
infringement.  Hosley Intern. Trading Corp. v. K Mart 
Corp.118 provides a good example of this exact scenario. 
This case concerns a design patent for the ornamental 
design of cauldron-shaped votive candleholders, which 
plaintiff Hosley International Trading Corporation 
alleged was infringed by Designco.119  In defense, 
Designco argued that its products do not incorporate 
the same two points of novelty as plaintiff’s patent.120  
Agreeing with the defense, the court found that the 
patentee’s points of novelty were not incorporated by 
the defendant, and thus granted Designco’s motion 
to dismiss despite finding that the defendant’s design 
might deceive an ordinary observer.121 
Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts focused 
largely on the actual design patents, rather than 
the perspective of the typical consumer, to find 
infringement.  In Metrokane, Inc. v. Wine Enthusiast,122 
a design patent infringement case concerning a lever-
operated corkscrew device for opening wine, the court 
in finding no infringement reiterated the two-part 
infringement test, but placed little emphasis on the 
perspective of the relevant consumer.123  Even in its 
assessment of the ordinary observer test—the first part 
of the infringement test—the court did not address the 
point of view of the consumer, instead substituting its 
own interpretation of the design patent drawings to 
determine the similarity of the goods.124 
Following the Egyptian Goddess decision, 
courts began to determine infringement according to 
consumer deception.  Although the Ordinary Observer 
Test was utilized before Egyptian Goddess, it received 
much greater emphasis afterwards when it became 
the sole measurement for infringement.  As such, 
courts began to place less emphasis on the claims in 
the design patents and began to focus on consumer 
deception. 
In interpreting the Ordinary Observer test, 
courts understood the ordinary observer to be a typical 
purchaser and accordingly found infringement when 
incorporated the same point of novelty). 
118.  Id.
119.  Id. at 908.
120.  Id. at 912.
121.  Id. at 911-12.
122.  185 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
123.  See id.
124.  See id. at 330 (analyzing the independent visual features 
of the devices one by one and concluding “the overall visual 
impressions they create are markedly different” without assessing 
how an ordinary purchaser might construe the similarity of the 
goods).  
a typical consumer might be confused as to the source 
of the goods during a typical shopping experience.125  
In Huztler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l Inc.,126 the 
court assessed design patent infringement by focusing 
on consumer deception instead of the design patent 
claims.127  Despite the fact that the similarities of 
the ornamental designs are typically assessed by the 
design patent drawings, the court assessed consumer 
deception in commerce: “Accordingly, the ‘ordinary 
observer’ here is someone who has seen, shopped for, 
or purchased food storage items of similar design.”128
B.  A comparison of the design patent  
  and trade dress infringement tests  
  following Egyptian Goddess   
  demonstrates how the two   
  doctrines are now the same.
 Patentees were pleased with the Egyptian 
Goddess holding because it lessened the burden for 
proving infringement.129  While the Federal Circuit’s 
concerns in Egyptian Goddess130 were legitimate, its 
actions in simply eliminating the second step of the 
previous infringement test did not account for the 
potential new problems this shift might create.131  
The Supreme Court sought to reinstate the 
125.  See e.g., Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l, Inc., 11 
CIV. 7211 PGG, 2012 WL 3031150, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 
2012); Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Maxim Lighting Int’l, Inc., No. Civ. 
A. 3:06–CV–995–K, 2009 WL 691594, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 
2009) (“The ordinary observer is therefore a member of the public 
who is currently shopping for or has recently purchased lighting 
fixtures—indeed, a ‘purchaser of things of similar design.’”). 
126.  11 CIV. 7211 PGG, 2012 WL 3031150 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 
2012).
127.  Hutzler, 2012 WL 3031150, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 
2012) (“patent infringement can be found for a design that is not 
identical to the patented design.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815, 
820 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); see also id. at *14 (“The Federal Circuit has 
made clear that it is error for a trial court to focus on ‘each [design] 
element separately instead of analyzing the design as a whole 
from the perspective of an ordinary observer.’” (quoting Amini 
Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2006))). 
128.  See Hutzler, 2012 WL 3031150, at *7.
129.  Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent Infringement: Post-
Egyptian Goddess, 2010 u. ILL. J.L. tech. & PoL’Y 239, 253-54 
(2010) (arguing that the elimination of the point of novelty test 
strengthened design patent holders’ rights because the burden 
in infringement cases had been shifted from the plaintiff to the 
accused infringer).   
130.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 
677 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (articulating concerns with the point of novelty 
test regarding its potential for abuse by design patent infringers).
131.  This Comment suggests that amending the infringement 
test also significantly altered the metes and bounds of the design 
patent property rights.   
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goals articulated in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White,132 
stating that the test for design patent infringement 
“must be sameness of appearance, and mere difference 
of lines in the drawing or sketch, a greater or smaller 
number of lines, or slight variances in configuration, 
if sufficient to change the effect upon the eye, will not 
destroy the substantial identity.”133  The Court further 
explained that the test need not be analyzed from the 
viewpoint of an expert.134  In light of this goal, the 
court in Egyptian Goddess also looked to see if an 
ordinary observer would perceive the two designs 
to be substantially the same such as to deceive the 
observer into purchasing one over the other.  Indeed, 
this test has been referred to as similar to the trade 
dress infringement test,135 and the words of the new test 
explicitly parallel trade dress infringement concerns.136  
Both tests focus on a layperson’s opinion.  
The design patent infringement test focuses on the 
layperson and not an expert because an expert would 
be highly unlikely to ever find two objects so similar 
as to the point of deception.  Similarly, trade dress is 
concerned with an ordinary consumer and not an expert 
in the field.  Moreover, the test seems to be concerned 
with an ordinary consumer of the goods, another factor 
likening this infringement test to trademark law.137  
Indeed, after Egyptian Goddess it appeared that both 
trademark infringement and design patent infringement 
were most concerned with the possibility of the average 
consumer’s likelihood of deception. 
c.  Allowing the coexistence of design 
patent and trade dress protection 
contradicts the Constitutional grant 
of authority for intellectual property 
protections for a limited time.
 
Not only is the potential overlap resulting in 
132.  81 U.S. 511 (1871). 
133.  Id. at 526-27. 
134.  See id. at 527 (suggesting that an expert’s perspective 
would never warrant finding infringement because every small 
change may seem large to someone well-versed in the field).
135.  See Kugler, supra note 30, at 71 (describing the design 
patent infringement test post Egyptian Goddess as “somewhat 
analogous to a likelihood of confusion test, a concept primarily 
related to trademark law”).
136.  See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 30) (“the 
minute distinction between design patent distinctiveness and 
trade dress distinctiveness may be that a trademark functions to 
indicate the source of goods while a design patent focuses on the 
appaearance of the goods themeselves.  These two . . . are, of 
course, largely overlapping.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
137.  See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) 
(emphasizing that the analysis should focus on the principal 
purchasers of the goods). 
automatic secondary meaning concerning for policy 
implications, but it is also contrary to the constitutional 
grant of patent authority.138  The Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution explicitly states that a patent 
will issue only for a “limited time.”139  Trademark 
law, which is not bound by the Intellectual Property 
clause of the Constitution, may potentially function 
indefinitely if the party consistently renews its right and 
uses the mark.140  
 If courts continue to allow coexistence of these 
rights, it may allow for an extended patent monopoly.141 
Recognizing the similarity of these rights, evidenced 
by their nearly identical infringement tests, allowing 
trade dress protection following a design patent could 
indefinitely extend the same rights and protections 
granted by the previous design patent.  This potential 
extension is contrary to the basic tenants of trademark 
law142 and upsets the delicate balance patent law seeks 
to preserve by depleting the public domain without any 
added benefit to the public as a result.  
Concerned with overprotection, the Supreme 
Court in Samara Brothers ruled that product design 
must always show secondary meaning before trade 
dress protection attaches.143  Allowing the overlap 
of these rights would undermine the Supreme 
Court’s expressed goals in Samara Brothers by 
lessening the secondary meaning burden for product 
design.144  While secondary meaning does require 
some affirmative step(s) to be taken by the rights 
holder (such as advertising or sales), fifteen years of 
138.  The Constitution grants authority of a patent for a 
“limited time.”  U.S. const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
139.  U.S. const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
140.  See The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002) (drawing 
its authority from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, it is 
not limited by the constitutional mandate that the authority be for a 
limited time). 
141.  Because the trade dress and design patent protection are 
arguably nearly identical following Egyptian Goddess, allowing the 
overlap of protection would essentially create an extended right.  
This rights overlap is particularly troublesome because together 
they cancel out each other’s limitations.  Trade dress protection 
for product design requires that secondary meaning be established 
before the protection attaches, a burden much lessened by the 
immediate protection a design patent grants.  Design patents allow 
immediate protection, but they are limited because they only last 
for a short period of time.  However, trade dress protection could 
extend the same right indefinitely. 
142.  Trademark law is commonly thought of as an extension 
of unfair competition law.
143.  See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
144.  See id. at 212 (explaining that design is like color in 
that it cannot be inherently distinctive, and thus requiring product 
designs to show they have established a source-identifying function 
in the consumers’ eyes before allowing trade dress protection to 
attach).
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exclusive use granted by a design patent significantly 
decreases that burden, and the steps necessary to 
secure secondary meaning become much easier.145  
Moreover, a design patent may issue before a good 
even is used in commerce and can be obtained much 
faster than trade dress protection.146  Thus, assuming, 
as this comment argues, that the rights are nearly 
identical, the immediate protection granted by a design 
patent undermines the benefit to the public and the 
free competition—the heart of the Supreme Court’s 
concerns in Samara Brothers.147
Some courts have justified overlapping 
protection by citing the differences between the 
two areas of law.148  For example, the Southern 
District of New York repeatedly cited the differences 
between design patents and trade dress as rationale 
for allowing overlapping rights.  In cases pre-dating 
Egyptian Goddess, such as Hubbell, the court cited 
the differences in the purposes behind each area of 
law as reason for allowing overlapping protection.149  
However, this rationale would no longer stand in 
light of Egyptian Goddess, because the rationales 
might remain distinct, but the practical effect of their 
protection is nearly identical. 
In fact, many courts have even cited the 
existence of a design patent as evidence that the trade 
dress is not functional, a bar trade dress rights seekers 
must overcome before protection attaches.150  Courts 
145.  See mccArthY, supra note 10, § 15:1 (4th ed. 2003) 
(describing secondary meaning as fact-dependent and listing forms 
of evidence  secondary meaning as customer surveys, evidences of 
sales volume, the length of time the mark has been used, and quality 
and quantity of advertising). 
146.  See Crouch, supra note 22, at 20 (calculating that nearly 
half of the design patents issued in 2009 were under review for less 
than a year).
147.   See Samara Bros, 529 U.S. at 215 (predicting that 
consumers would be harmed if product design trade dress was 
considered always inherently distinctive).   
148.  See Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 
955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (comparing the goals of patent law and 
trademark law and concluding that the two are distinct areas of law 
because patent seeks to further invention whereas trademark law 
seeks to protect the consumer from brand or source confusion); id. 
at 960 (“The trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection, 
it is true, but in an infringement suit must also prove secondary 
meaning and likelihood of confusion, which the owner of a design 
patent need not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency 
between the two modes of protection.” (quoting W.T. Rogers Co. v. 
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985))).
149.  See Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 
955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing the differences between the 
trade dress and design patent infringement tests as justification for 
allowing their overlapping protection).  
150.  See E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., No. 
00 Civ. 8670, 2003 WL 22068573, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding 
a design patent to be helpful evidence of non-functionality, and thus 
also helpful in establishing trade dress protection).
have said that the existence of a design patent helps 
to establish that a design on a piece of manufacture is 
not functional and that the existence of a design patent 
prior to trade dress protection does not upset policy 
concerns because upon the expiration of a patent, a 
design may be copied so long as it does not confuse a 
consumer.151 
Interestingly, some courts remained skeptical 
of overlapping rights even before Egyptian Goddess.152  
Specifically, in Winning Ways, the district court 
expressed hesitation about the coexistence of design 
patent and trade dress protection.153  In particular, the 
court was concerned that secondary meaning may be 
achieved only because of the previously issued design 
patent.154  Although it remained the minority viewpoint, 
this case indicates that some courts remained concerned 
about potential overprotection resulting from 
overlapping rights. 
d.  Addressing the alternative argument: 
what is the proper role for design 
patents?
Design patents were originally codified to 
fill a gap between utility patents and copyright law.155  
As a result, some have theorized that the proper role 
for design patents is to continue to serve as a legal 
gap filler, protecting areas from which trade dress 
specifically has reseeded.156  Dennis Crouch has 
observed that design patents are well suited to serve 
a “bootstrapping” role, specifically as a tool to help 
151.  See id.; Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 
F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that trade dress 
infringement requires consumer confusion).
152.  See Matheson, supra note 102, at 2; Stormy Clime, Ltd. 
v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Courts 
must proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered 
trademark protection in the design of products so as not to 
undermine the objectives of the patent laws . . . .  Since trademark 
protection extends for an unlimited period, expansive trade dress 
protection for the design of products would prevent some functional 
products from enriching the public domain.”).
153.  See generally Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway 
Sportswear, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (D. Kan. 1996). 
154.  See id. at 1460-61; 903 F. Supp. 1457 (“Granting 
trade dress protection to an item for which a patent has expired 
creates tension because the product may have obtained secondary 
meaning or inherent distinctiveness precisely because the product 
was patented.  If so, the trade dress protection does not have an 
independent basis and effectively extends the monopoly granted by 
the patent.”); see also supra note 106. 
155.  See Crouch, supra note 22, at 41 (discussing the “gap-
filling” role of design patents). 
156.  See generally id. (justifying the purpose of design 
patents as filling the holes that other intellectual property doctrines, 
specifically trademark and trade dress, have left unprotected).
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rights holders secure trade dress protection.157  He 
mentions three specific ways the existence of a design 
patent alleviates the burden of establishing trade 
dress.158  First, he notes that design patents may serve 
as evidence of non-functionality.159  The functionality 
doctrine is a strict burden all trade dress rights 
seekers must overcome.160  A design patent, while not 
enough on its own, serves as strong evidence that the 
design is not functional.161  Second, the existence of a 
design patent facilitates the acquisition of secondary 
meaning.162  Exclusive use for fifteen years severely 
lessens the burden of establishing secondary meaning, 
which requires that consumers view the design 
primarily as a source indicator and not as the product 
itself.163  Finally, Crouch suggests that a design patent 
can protect a design immediately, filling the period of 
time that a rights holder would otherwise have to wait 
unprotected against copy-cat competitors before trade 
dress protection came to fruition.164
Yet, it is precisely these gaps that trade dress 
and trademark law must leave open to maintain an 
equal benefit to the consumers and the rights holders.  
These gaps represent the tradeoffs rights holders give 
up to the public domain.  Allowing design patents to 
fill all of these gaps tips the balance strongly in favor of 
rights holders and depletes the public domain.165  This 
is injurious to the public and counter to the policy goals 
of trademark law.166  Moreover, it is counter to the 
157.  Id. (manuscript at 38-40).  
158.  Id. (discussing what he calls design patent 
“bootstrapping”).
159.  See id. (manuscript at 38-49) (calling this phenonmenon 
the “anti-TrafFix doctrine”).  
160.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
165 (1995) (describing the functionality doctrine as a necessary 
feature of trademark law to promote free and open competition). 
161.  See Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 Civ. 
7302, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556, at *29-30 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
13, 1996); E.Z. Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., 2003 
WL 22068573 No. 00 Civ. 8670 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), at *24.  The 
requirements for proving functionality, or lack thereof, for a design 
patent and trademark or trade dress differ, and thus the existence of 
a design patent does not serve as enough evidence in and of itself to 
establish nonfunctionality.  See Crouch, Supra note 22 (manuscript 
at 39) (discussing Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Jaccard Corp., a case in 
which the district court allowed trade dress rights to attach to the 
same design once protected by a design patent and asserting that a 
design patent “simply serves as another piece of evidence to be used 
by the jury in determiing non-functionality.”).  
162.  See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 40) (explaining 
that the existence of a design patent does not alone establish 
secondary meaning, but significantly eases the burden).  
163.  Id.
164.  Id.
165.  The constant goal of intellectual property law is to 
maintain a balance between incentivizing invention and protecting 
the public. 
166.  See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 
Supreme Court’s goals as stated in Samara Brothers.167  
E.  Trade dress protection where there is a 
  utility patent: the TrafFix   
  interpretation 
 Although the Supreme Court has not 
yet addressed the effect of an expired design patent on 
the issuance of trade dress protection, it has analyzed 
the effect of an expired utility patent.  In Traffix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,168 defendant 
Marketing Displays began copying plaintiff’s two-
spring sign feature, which was created to keep the 
sign standing despite strong wind.169  Traffix Devices, 
Inc. had obtained a utility patent for this feature, and 
upon the patent’s expiration Marketing Displays, Inc. 
began copying the device.170  Traffix Devices, Inc. 
sued for trade dress protection, arguing its product had 
achieved the necessary secondary meaning.171  The 
Court held that the existence of utility patent creates a 
strong presumption that a design is functional and thus 
ineligible for trade dress protection.172  However, the 
Court was careful to state that the existence of a utility 
patent is not necessarily determinative of functionality, 
but a big aspect for a court to consider.173 
Conversely, many courts have interpreted the 
existence of a design patent as evidence that the design 
seeking trade dress protection is not functional.174  
595, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating the goals of trademark law are 
to prevent consumer confusion as to the source of the goods).
167.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 
U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (explaining that product design (as compared 
to product packaging) is more akin to color in that the “consumer 
predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist . . 
. even the most unusual of product designs-such as a cocktail shaker 
shaped like a penguin-is intended not to identify the source, but to 
render the product itself more useful or more appealing”).  But see 
Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 6) (suggesting that Samara 
Brothers narrowed trade dress protection precisely because of the 
availability of design patent protection).
168.  See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 
U.S. 23, 25-26 (2001).
169.  See id. (explaining the successful, wind-resistent two-
spring device was also a visible feature of the signs).  
170.  See id. (discussing that defendant not only deliberately 
waited for the utility patent to expire so that he could copy the 
plaintiff’s sign features, but also similarly named his company). 
171.  See id. at 26-27 (reviewing procedural posture whereby 
the district court found no evidence of secondary meaning and 
alternatively that the device was functional). 
172.  See id.
173.  See id. at 30 (describing disproving functionality as 
a “heavy burden” that can be dispelled by showing the feature 
is “merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the 
device”).
174.  See E.Z. Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., 2003 
WL 22068573 No. 00 Civ. 8670 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), at *24 (noting 
that a design patent is helpful evidence of non-functionality).
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However, the existence of a design patent on the 
same subject matter for which trade dress protection 
is sought should also trigger courts to examine with 
great scrutiny whether overlapping rights would be 
constitutional. 
F.  Readjusting courts’ interpretations of  
  overlapping rights: a recommendation  
  for moving forward 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Egyptian 
Goddess and Samara Brothers should cause courts to 
reconsider so easily granting trade dress protection 
where a design patent currently, or previously, 
existed.175  Of course, the existence of a design patent 
may still be helpful in determining non-functionality, 
but the burden of showing secondary meaning should 
remain stringent. 
 As it stands currently, a design patent provides 
fifteen years of exclusive use.176  Moreover, design 
patent prosecution is a much easier and faster process 
than the steps necessary for obtaining trade dress 
protection.177  As such, a party seeking the strongest 
protection for a design can obtain a design patent 
before that design is used in commerce, use the fifteen 
years (or less) granted by the patent as an aid in 
establishing secondary meaning, and then when either 
seeking to register the trade dress or assert unregistered 
trade dress rights, use the design patent as existence of 
non-functionality.178  
The Egyptian Goddess infringement test 
shift lessened the burden on design patent holders 
for proving infringement.179  However, it also greatly 
altered the metes and bounds of the patent property 
right.  As it now stands, according to the current 
infringement test, a design patent and trade dress 
protection offer nearly identical protective rights.180  
175.  See discussion infra concerning how a design patent can 
be used as a useful tool in establishing trade dress protection. 
176.  35 U.S.C. § 173. 
177.  See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 18-21) 
(discussing the rapidity at which design patents are issued and the 
available means for speeding up the process).  
178.  See id. (manuscript at 38-40) (disccusing what he calls 
“bootstrapping,” or the process whereby a rights owner uses a 
design patent to fill the holes not protected by trade dress and as a 
tool in establishing distinctiveness and nonfunctionality).  
179.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (abridging the previous design patent infringement 
test by eliminating the second step and establishing the ordinary 
observer test as the sole analysis for design patent infringement).
180.  See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 3) (“Both 
regimes focus on the visual appearance of a product or its 
packaging and both regimes allow the rights-holder to exclude 
others from uses that lead to customer confusion.”).
Allowing design patents to fill the holes left open by 
trade dress thus only further blurs design patent and 
trade dress protection.  
In line with the Supreme Courts goals in 
Samara Brothers—to enhance the standard required for 
trade dress protection—courts should not allow parties 
to use a design patent as an easy road to showing 
secondary meaning.181  Certainly the party seeking 
trade dress protection will still carry the burden of 
using the good in commerce and marketing the good; 
however, the burden of achieving secondary meaning 
will certainly be lessened by fifteen years of exclusive 
use.  Following the Court’s rationale in TrafFix, this 
Comment urges courts to view the existence of a 
current or expired design patent as strong evidence that 
the design is not distinctive.  The Court ruled in TrafFix 
that the existence of a utility patent would trigger a 
presumption that the trade dress was functional.182  
Similarly, the existence of a design patent should be 
trigger the presumption that the mark is not distinctive.  
Of course, for product design trade dress the mark 
already requires secondary meaning to acquire the 
distinctiveness necessary for trade dress protection.183  
The existence of a design patent in this situation would 
therefore trigger a stronger showing of secondary 
meaning.  Courts should view the design patent as a 
sign that the rights seeker’s path to secondary meaning 
was significantly lessened by the patent monopoly, and 
thus courts should require that the secondary meaning 
necessary for distinctiveness be more persuasive than 
would be necessary otherwise. 
    
concLusIon 
 The concerns of overlapping rights and 
extended monopolies have real and tangible effects 
on the marketplace and competition.  The headline 
grabbing cases such as Apple v. Samsung help remind 
courts and the public of the costs, both financially and 
to the free marketplace, of loose regulations and casual 
scrutiny.  
The Supreme Court has long regarded 
overlapping rights with skepticism.  This suspicion 
181.  The Supreme Court in Samara Brothers recognized that 
product design for trade dress does not inherently serve a source-
identifying function.  Thus, it requires a showing of acquired 
distinctiveness (secondary meaning) before trade dress protection 
can attach. Fifteen years of exclusive use, granted by a design 
patent, would severely lessen, if not nearly eradicate, the burden the 
Supreme Court sought to establish in Samara Brothers. 
182.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 
U.S. 23, 31 (2001). 
183.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 
205, 216 (2000).
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is necessary to ensure that the intellectual property 
rights remained balanced.  The underlying policy goals 
require that the greatest benefit possible be bestowed to 
both the public and the inventors, to incentivize and to 
ensure society profits as a result.  
 This is no different in the case of overlapping 
trade dress protection and design patents.  Although 
previously courts were able to justify overlapping 
rights by citing the distinct differences between these 
two protective rights, they have since merged in a 
way that allowing overlapping rights without further 
scrutiny could result in prolonged, unconstitutional 
monopolistic use.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in Egyptian Goddess altered the infringement 
test for design patents and in so doing, also altered the 
defined property rights associated with design patents.  
As such, the infringement test and the protective rights 
of design patents are now nearly identical to those of 
trade dress.  Allowing design patents to serve as useful 
aids in establishing trade dress undermines the stated 
goals of trade dress protection.  The protective gaps left 
by trade dress protection are not due to congressional 
or judicial oversight, but are a result of careful 
consideration and recognition of the delicate balance 
intellectual property law seeks to maintain.  The 
protective holes are space that is dedicated to the public 
domain.  If design patents are able to fill those gaps, the 
public domain—and public—suffers as a result.
 Consequently, courts must be careful in their 
consideration of trade dress and design patents for 
identical subject matter.  Moreover, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office should also remain 
diligent when assessing the registration of trade dress 
for subject matter already protected, or previously 
protected, by a design patent.  The consequences 
of not doing so may have severe anti-competitive 
effects.  Large companies such as Apple and Nike 
consistently seek to bolster their intellectual property 
protective measures, and in allowing this overlap, their 
competitors are put at a severe disadvantage.  
In line with the Court’s decisions in TrafFix 
and Samara Brothers, the existence of a design patent 
should trigger a presumption that the trade dress is not 
distinctive.  In the case where the party seeks trade 
dress protection for product design, which already 
requires secondary meaning (acquired distinctiveness), 
the burden on the rights seeking party should be 
stronger than it would be otherwise to prove that the 
public views the trade dress as an indication of source.  
Bearing in mind this recommendation, courts 
can continue to evaluate, and allow, some overlapping 
rights.  It is commonplace for one product to be 
protected by multiple facets of intellectual property 
law.  However, in light of the recent shift in the 
protective boundaries of design patents, it is imperative 
that courts remain diligent in preventing rights holders 
from extending what the Constitution mandates are 
“limited rights.”184 
  
184.  U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
